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Since the concept “ultimate controller” brought out by La Porta （1999）, scholars 
have found that except rich common law countries such as UK and the United States, 
the main conflict in corporate governance was not the conflict between managers and 
shareholders, but the conflict between the inner controlling shareholder and the outer 
small shareholders. In fact, the inner controller is controlled by the ultimate 
controlling shareholder. The complexity and concealment of ultimate controller will 
make him use all resorts to maximize his own benefit, so that the benefits of outer 
small shareholders will be hurt. Because the stagnancy of legal system construction, 
many irregular problems in the stock market of our country are also related to the 
ultimate controller. The theory of capital structure shows that manager’s behavior will 
affect the firm’s capital structure. The large shareholder may implement stronger 
surveillance to managers or even change the manager. So the benefit of managers will 
be consistent with that of the large shareholder. Because the change of manager’s 
behavior will affect the firm’s capital structure, then many theories consider there are 
correlations between capital structure and ownership structure. Then how about the 
ultimate controller affects capital structure? Hence, this paper will trace to the 
ultimate controller, investigate about the effects of the ultimate controller’s three 
characteristics to the capital structure, which are the separation of control rights and 
cash flow rights, kinds and control layers. This has important academic value and 
praxis significance to protect the benefits of small shareholders, and consummate the 
mechanism of corporate governance.  
  In this study, the author conducts a research according to the data of 3408 listed 
companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets ranging from the year of 2004 to 
2007, in order to find out the major motives of the shareholders in deciding capital 
structure, their behavioral differences as well as predatory behaviors. The findings are 
as follows:  
(1) The separation of ultimate control rights and cash flow rights prevails among 43% 















holding listed companies as compared with state-owned holding ones. 
(2) Almost all listed companies are single-track controlled, only one company is 
different， of which the ultimate controller uses cross-holding in the control chain. 
The ultimate controllers with different ownership kinds have difference in their 
control manner. Non-state ultimate controllers have higher ratio in direct control 
and longer layers pyramid control than that of state ultimate controller. And the 
main control manner of both non-state and state ultimate controllers is pyramid 
with 2 to 3 layers. 
(3) By testing the degree and size of the separation of ultimate control right and cash 
flow right, this paper discovers that shareholders with ultimate control right pay 
more attention to the non-dilution effect with respect to stock ownership, whereas 
the effects regarding to transfer restriction on asset of debt and threats of 
bankruptcy constitute only minor significance. 
(4) The ownership kinds of ultimate controllers pose limited impact on the decision of 
capital structure. The state-owned ultimate controllers do not drastically magnify 
the non-dilution effect of debt comparing to the non-state-owned ultimate 
controllers. 
(5) The layers of ultimate controller are positively related to capital structure of the 
firm. That is to say, the longer of the layers, the more debt the ultimate controller 
prefers to financing. 
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本文利用 2004-2007 年在沪深两市上市的 A 股数据为样本，从终极控制人角
度分析我国终极股权结构的现状，并运用规范和实证相结合的研究方法分析了终
                                                        
① “Tunnelling”被定义为控制股东为了自身利益将企业的资产和利润向外部转移的行为。 
②见 Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny. Large shareholders and corporate control [J]. Journal of Political 
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